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Abstract
When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges,
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support
of the electors of that state
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INTRODUCTION

When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges,
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support
of the electors of that state.1 This is what the Supreme Court of Florida did
in 2012 in the case of Telli v. Broward County,2 which held that counties
should be allowed “to govern themselves, including [enacting] term limits
[for] their officials, in accordance with their home rule authority.”3 It is
being interpreted to opine that charter counties may impose term limits
through their charters on any and all county officers—including the
Constitution’s County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, which includes the office of the
Tax Collector.4 This recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion receded
from—that is, determined that the Court would no longer abide by—its
previous opinion in Cook v. City of Jacksonville (Cook II),5 issued ten years
prior, which expressly and unambiguously held that charter counties could
not limit the terms of the Constitution’s five County Officers enumerated in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.6
1.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
2.
94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
3.
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
4.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
5.
823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002).
6.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook v.
City of Jacksonville (Cook II), 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002); City of Jacksonville v. Cook
(Cook I), 765 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook
v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
2002).
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The decision in Telli, which is supported by scarce legal analysis, is
in direct conflict with the Florida Constitution.7 Telli represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of charter counties’ home rule power—as
limited by the Florida Constitution—and also a misunderstanding of the
status of the five County Officers created and established by article VIII,
section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.8
Another article has been published regarding this case in 2013 by
Daniel S. Weinger, titled Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v.
Broward County.9 We would like to note that we agree with Mr. Weinger’s
position regarding the past precedent leading up to Telli, and his discussion
of stare decisis.10 We do, however, respectfully disagree with his discussion
of operative language of the Constitutional provisions pertaining to “County
Officers” and “County Commissioners”—discussed more fully below.11
Furthermore, we note that Mr. Weinger’s article did not address several
important issues with the case.12
Florida is divided into sixty-seven county political subdivisions, each
served by one general purpose government entity—Board of County
Commissioners—and five specific purpose one-officer entities, the
Constitution’s County Officers: Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Circuit Court.13 All county
governments have home rule power under the Florida Constitution,
regardless of whether they take form as a charter county government form of
home rule, or non-charter county government form of home rule.14 Home
rule—ever since 1968—is vested inherently in each county.15 However, the
Constitution still provides limitations on county home rule.16 There are two
7.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Daniel S.
Weinger, Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. Broward County, 42 STETSON L. REV.
859, 859–60 (2013).
8.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Weinger,
supra note 7, at 859, 868–69.
9.
Weinger, supra note 7, at 859, 868–73.
10.
Id. at 860–68.
11.
See infra text accompanying note 119. Interestingly enough, Mr. Weinger
served as co-appellate counsel for the Board of County Commissioners challenging the term
limit provision in the Telli case. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–06; Weinger, supra note 7, at 859.
12.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–13; Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–73.
13.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (c)–(d), (f)–(g) (noting unless one or more
offices in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) is abolished under applicable constitutional
authority). Although much of this article will focus on duties and provisions of the Tax
Collector, the broader implications are applicable to all five of the Constitution’s County
Officers. Id. See infra Parts II.C., III.A.–B.
14.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (f)–(g).
15.
See id. § 1(a).
16.
See id. § 1(f)–(g).
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categories of such limitations, which include those limits on non-charter
counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (f), and those limits
on charter counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (g).17
The Constitution’s five County Officers18—as created by and
established under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida
Constitution—have been imbued with sovereignty and maintain a status of
independence from the county government, the Board of County
Commissioners.19 These officers maintain sovereign plenary power to carry
out important state work assigned to them by general law to be performed
and carried out at the county level and to exercise reasonable discretion in
carrying out that work, not inconsistent with the express duties.20 These
officers are not subject to regulation or interference by the local county
government—the Board of County Commissioners.21 Therefore, any charter
provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County Officers will not be
enforceable, save for a provision establishing a different manner for their
selection—but being selected in a different manner does not change their
status as the Constitution’s County Officers.22
17.
Id.
18.
Id. § 1(d). It is important to understand the terms that we have chosen to
describe the five County Officers listed in, and created by, article VIII, section 1, subsection
(d) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). Throughout this article, we
refer to these officers as the “Constitution’s County Officers.” Id. This is because they are
created by the Constitution. Id. Some cases have referred to them as “Constitutional County
Officers,” “Constitutionally-authorized County Officers,” or some other related title. See,
e.g., Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla.
2012). We believe referring to these officers as either “Constitutional” or “Constitutionallyauthorized” is misleading. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418–19.
These titles have been used by the courts to distinguish the five article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), county officers from a charter-created officer to whom the duties of the article
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officer have been transferred, and which may retain the
same name and responsibilities. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). For a more detailed discussion
of the abolition of an article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) officer and the transfer of his or her
duties, resulting in a charter officer, see infra Part II.C. However, if a charter county follows
the correct procedures laid out in the Constitution under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
to abolish a Constitution-created “County Office” and transfers its duties to a charter-created
office, then the resulting charter office is also constitutional. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see
infra Part II.C. To avoid confusion, we refer to the article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
“County Officers,” as created by the Constitution, as the “Constitution’s County Officers” or
“Constitution County Officer,” and to any charter-created office carrying out the same duties
after abolition and transfer as the “charter’s county officer.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see
infra Parts II–V.
19.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
20.
See id. § 1(f).
21.
Id.
22.
Id. § 1(d).
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A charter county may abolish one or more of the Constitution’s five
County Offices and transfer the duties performed by that office to a charter
office—either charter-elected or charter-appointed.23 For example, in the
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia county political subdivisions, the
Constitution’s County Tax Collector—even though it may be referred to by
the same name under the charter—no longer exists.24 The charter’s
appointed Tax Collector now exists in its place in these counties, and this
charter office may be regulated to its fullest extent by the local government,
not inconsistent with the state duties established under Chapter 197 of the
Florida Statutes,25 and other applicable general law.26
The recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in Telli is in direct
contradiction with the above-summarized provisions of the Florida
Constitution.27 First, it fails to acknowledge the important limitations placed
on counties’ home rule power under the Constitution.28 Second, it
undermines completely the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers
by holding that charter counties may term limit any and all county officers
through their charters—even the Constitution’s County Officers—when
those offices have not been first abolished under the county charter.29
Accordingly, the lower court decision from the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in the case should have been affirmed, but on different grounds:
(1) because charter counties have broad authority over their Board of County
Commissioners and any of their charter-elected or charter-appointed officers
under their charters, including the authority to set term limits on the charters’
officers—including County Commissioners—and; (2) because counties do
not have the authority to regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s five
County Officers and thus do not have the power to term limit any one of the
Constitution’s County Officers whose office has not been abolished and
duties transferred to a charter-created office.30 Regardless of what the
23.
Id.
24.
DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01(A) (2012); BROWARD
COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06(a) (2010); VOLUSIA COUNTY CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1(1)(a)
(2002); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
25.
FLA. STAT. § 197.332(2) (2014); see also DADE COUNTY HOME RULE
CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01; BROWARD COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06; VOLUSIA COUNTY
CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1.
26.
Weinger, supra note 7, at 862–63.
27.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g), with Telli v. Broward Cnty.,
94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
28.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 507; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g).
29.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g).
30.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Snipes v.
Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward
Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
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Supreme Court of Florida held in the Telli opinion, county charter term limits
are not effective as to the Constitution’s County Officers.31
The following sections of this article will explore the preceding
analysis in depth.32 Part II will include important background on county
governance under the Florida Constitution, including the development of the
county home rule in Florida, the difference between charter and non-charter
county governance, and the status that our Florida Constitution gives to the
five Constitution County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), as well as the relationship between charter and non-charter
counties and the Constitution’s County Officers in each of their respective
counties.33 Part III will include an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court of
Florida decision in Telli, and how that decision misinterprets county home
rule and ignores the status of the Constitution’s County Officers.34 Part IV
includes a discussion of some possible pathways of review.35
II.

BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION

The Florida Constitution provides that the state shall be divided into
political subdivisions called counties.36 The Constitution leaves it up to the
Florida Legislature to determine the number and boundaries of such
counties.37 Currently, there are sixty-seven counties in Florida.38
The Constitution also establishes that there shall be one county
government in each county political subdivision and provides that such
county governments exercise home rule power, either in the form of a noncharter county government39 or charter county government.40 However, the
Constitution also provides that there shall be six more distinct government
entities that shall be integral to that county’s political subdivision.41 These
include one collegial, general purpose entity in the form of the Board of

31.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
32.
See infra Parts II–IV.
33.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.
34.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; infra Part III.
35.
See infra Part IV.
36.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (“The state shall be divided by law into
political subdivisions called counties.”).
37.
Id. (“Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law, with
provision for payment or apportionment of the public debt.”).
38.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 7 (2014).
39.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (f).
40.
Id. § 1(g).
41.
Id. § 1(d)–(e).
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County Commissioners42 and each of the five distinct one-officer, special
purpose entities, which include: Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Court.43 These five, one-officer,
special purpose entities are created by the Florida Constitution—labeled
“County Officers”—and exist in every county political subdivision in
Florida; even in counties that have adopted charters, unless any charter
county has by charter provision abolished such an office and transferred its
duties to either a charter-elected or charter-appointed office.44
A.

1968 Constitution and the Shift in Counties’ Home Rule

“Home rule” generally refers to the “allocati[on] [of] a measure of
autonomy to a local government.”45 In other words, a local government that
has home rule power governs its own local affairs and does not have to seek
legislative authority for what it does.46 Prior to the 1968 Constitution,
counties in Florida derived home rule authority only as directly granted from
the Florida Legislature “through [the] passage of local bills,”47 and did not
have any independent or inherent powers of self-government.48 This
previous form of home rule in Florida was commonly referred to as Dillon’s
Rule.49 Based on the increasing population and growth needs of the people

42.
Id. § 1(e).
43.
Id. § 1(d).
44.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). There are certain limited ways, provided by
the Constitution, in which a charter county government may alter or abolish one or more of
these six county government entities, which will be discussed in Part II.C.1–3. See discussion
infra Part II.C.1–3.
45.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014). The verbatim definition
in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of
autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.” Id. This
definition is somewhat misleading because, as discussed infra, in Florida, home rule power is
allocated under the State’s constitution, and therefore, is not an allocation of power from the
legislature, but an inherent power based on the consent of the people to be governed. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
46.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 45, at 850.
47.
C. Wayne Alford & John H. Wolf, Comment, Constitutional Revision:
County Home Rule in Florida—The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 282, 282–83
(1966).
48.
Mark J. Wolff, Home Rule in Florida: A Critical Appraisal, 19 STETSON
L. REV. 853, 859 (1990).
49.
See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 169, 221 (1983) (discussing Dillon’s Rule, under which “local government[s
only] consisted of delegated or enumerated powers,” and thus characterizing “local
governments as creatures of the state legislature”).
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of Florida,50 and the increasing demands that the passage of local bills were
placing on the Legislature,51 the people of Florida passed the 1968
Constitution which includes express provisions addressing the home rule
power of county political subdivisions.52 The fundamental force of these
provisions of the 1968 Constitution meant that counties in Florida have
inherent governing power and no longer have to request a specific law from
the Florida Legislature to justify or authorize local county action.53 Broad as
this power may be, the Constitution still limits this inherent power with
different limitations for non-charter home rule and charter county home
rule.54
B.

The Difference Between Charter Counties and Non-Charter
Counties Under the Florida Constitution

All sixty-seven county political subdivisions in Florida possess home
rule power inherently, regardless of whether they have a charter or not.55
Under the 1968 Constitution, non-charter counties possess “such power of
self-government as is provided by general56 or special law57 . . . [and] [t]he
[B]oard of [C]ounty [C]ommissioners . . . may enact . . . county ordinances
not inconsistent with general or special law.”58 Relatedly, charter county
50.
See Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (“It is a practical response to persistent
increases in demand for fundamental services such as water, sewage, transportation, zoning,
and police and fire protection, precipitated by steadily increasing populations . . . .”).
51.
See, e.g., Alford & Wolf, supra note 47, at 283 (stating that “[i]n 1965, the
Florida Legislature passed 1186 special and local bills,” dwarfing the number of general bills
it passed, at a mere 586).
52.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g).
53.
See Wolff, supra note 48, at 861–62.
54.
Id. at 881; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g).
55.
Wolff, supra note 48, at 880.
56.
Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1157
(Fla. 1989). A general law is one that “operates universally throughout the state, uniformly
upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible
classification.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (en
banc)).
57.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g). The Constitution defines a “special law” as a
special or local law. Id.
“[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons
or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when
classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is
one relating to, or designed to, operate only in a specifically indicated part of the
State, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification
is not permissible or the classification is illegal.”

City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Landis, 163 So. at 240
(emphasis omitted)).
58.
FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 1(f).
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governments possess “all powers of local self-government not inconsistent
with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors,” and
the Board of County Commissioners “may enact county ordinances not
inconsistent with general law.”59
Fundamentally, all counties—whether charter or non-charter—
possess inherent home rule power, and the only fundamental difference
between the home rule power of charter counties and non-charter counties is
the limitations placed upon them.60 For all counties in Florida, home rule
power is limited by both general law enactments of the Florida Legislature
and the provisions of the Florida Constitution; but in non-charter counties,
home rule is also limited further by special law enactments of the Florida
Legislature.61
The Florida Legislature has provided broad powers of local selfgovernance to all counties through general law by enacting the provisions of
chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes.62 Essentially, chapter 125 of the Florida
Statutes operates as a quasi-default charter for non-charter counties, but is
used in practice by charter counties as well.63 The provisions that exist for
non-charter counties under chapter 125 are very broad and non-restrictive.64
In essence, under current law, there are several things that counties
can accomplish under the charter county government structure that either
cannot be accomplished, or can only be accomplished indirectly, under noncharter county government structure.65 Examples include:
1)
Citizen recall enabling voters of the county to vote to
remove members of the Board of County Commissioners;66
2)
Citizen initiatives to vote on proposed ordinances;67
59.
Id. § 1(g) (emphasis added). This distinction between powers of selfgovernment and local self-government has not been defined. See id. However, we would
argue that it means that non-charter home rule is limited to self-government, and charter home
rule has a further limitation in that it is limited to local self-government. Id. Therefore, a
charter cannot write anything that is not truly local in nature. Id.
60.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g).
61.
Id. § 1(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 850; see also FLA.
STAT. ch. 125 (2014). Those special law enactments passed by the Florida Legislature will
only apply to charter counties if the voters in the county also pass it by referendum. FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 10. “Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local
self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the
electors.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (emphasis added).
62.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 125.
63.
See id.
64.
See id.; 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (1981).
65.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 125.
66.
See id. § 100.361(1).
67.
See id. § 125.66(4)(b)(1).
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3)
Non-partisan elections of the Board of County
Commissioners;68
4)
Term limits for the Board of County Commissioners;69
5)
Change in the length of terms for the Board of County
Commissioners;70
6)
Change in the districts represented by each County
Commissioner, including at-large districts;71
7)
County ordinances to prevail in the event of conflict
with and over municipal ordinances on the same subject;72
8)
Exclusive power in the county over community
redevelopment authorities with tax increment financing;73
9)
County authority to levy a municipal public service tax
outside of a city in the county;74
10)
Levy of a communication service tax at a higher rate;75
11)
Abolish any of the State Constitution’s County
Officers—Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, Supervisor
of Elections, and Clerk of Court—and then transfer the duties to
a charter-created office in order to put them under the control of
the Board of County Commissioners;76 and/or

68.
See 00-02 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 6 (2000).
69.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). This
is in line with the holding of Telli, and an interpretation of article VIII, section 1, subsection
(e) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
However, the holding of Telli, with respect to term limits of the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, is
erroneous and in contradiction to the provisions and structure of the Florida Constitution. See
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. For full discussion of this issue, see
infra Part III.B.
70.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“Except when otherwise provided by
county charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners
composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms of four years.”) (emphasis
added).
71.
See FLA. STAT. § 124.01(4).
72.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f) (For non-charter county governments “an
ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality
to the extent of such conflict.”); id. § 1(g) (For charter county governments: “The charter
shall provide which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal
ordinances.”).
73.
See FLA. STAT. § 163.410.
74.
See id. § 166.231(1)(c).
75.
See id. § 202.19(1).
76.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.C.2.
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12)
Have special acts of the Legislature to be inapplicable
within the county unless approved by referendum.77
C.

Status of the Constitution’s “County Officers” (art. VIII, section 1,
subsection (d))

In Amos v. Mathews,78 a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered
prior to the 1968 Constitution, the Court described the division of power and
duties of state and local officers as such:
It is fundamentally true that all local powers must have
their origin in a grant by the state which is the fountain and source
of authority. . . . [I]t is therefore the spirit of the Constitution, that
the performance of state functions shall be confided to state
officers; the performance of county functions of purely local
concern shall be confided to county officers. Save as is otherwise
clearly contemplated by the Constitution, there can be no
compromise with that principle, the origin of which is more
ancient than the Constitution itself.79

As noted above, prior to 1968, any and all county officers had the
power to govern local affairs only to the extent that home rule power was
granted to them by the Legislature.80
However, that power structure changed as a result of the 1968
Constitution, which vested in non-charter counties such powers of selfgoverning by general or special law, and in charter counties “all powers of
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law
approved by vote of the electors.”81 In essence, this change “denotes a broad
empowerment of local authorities to . . . rule[] in matters of genuine local
concern,” and “shift[ed] [to] locus of decision-making power back to those
in the best position to assess those needs, freeing the state legislature to
concentrate on the issues that have a genuine statewide impact.”82

77.
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.”)
(emphasis added).
78.
126 So. 308 (Fla. 1930).
79.
Id. at 320.
80.
See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 27; Louis C. Deal, Constitutional
Home Rule of Unchartered Counties—Fantasy or Fact?, 56 FLA. B. J. 469, 469 (1982); Wolff,
supra note 48, at 859–60.
81.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
82.
Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the division of state and local powers under the 1968
Constitution allows for local regulation of purely local officers, and state
regulation of state officers.83 The Constitution’s County Officers listed in
and created only by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), hold an
independent status in our state and Constitution.84 They are not local officers
with purely local duties as defined in Amos, but rather they are the state
Constitution’s sovereign County Officers with plenary power to implement
important state duties under state law and state rule on the local level.85
Although the five officers listed in article VIII, section 1, subsection
(d) are labeled County Officers, they are the Constitution’s County Officers
in and for each county political subdivision and they hold a constitutional
sovereign status.86 This sovereign status is of special consequence and
benefit to Floridians because of the important state work that these
Constitution County Officers perform on the county level, which is an
overriding State interest and—notwithstanding dicta in court and Attorney
General opinions—is not county business.87 The sovereign status of these
officers is well explained in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review
Board88 as follows:
[U]nder Florida’s [C]onstitution, certain responsibilities of local
governance are separately entrusted to independent constitutional
officers who, at least in non-charter counties [who have not
abolished the Constitution’s County Officers], are not accountable
to the county’s governing board, but derive their power directly

83.
Amos, 126 So. at 320; Deal, supra note 80, at 469; Wolff, supra note 48,
at 859–60; see also FLA CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
84.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
85.
See id. § 1(g); Amos, 126 So. at 308, 320. The best example of state
duties performed by the tax collectors is property tax collection. See FLA. STAT. § 197.603
(2014) (“The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of property taxes by
county tax collectors. . . . The Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized
by this chapter under [section] 9(a), [a]rt. VII of the State Constitution be free from the
influence or the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and
receive property tax revenues.” (emphasis added)). Other state duties include: Title, tag, and
driver’s license services, sale of hunting and fishing licenses, collection of other taxes on the
local level, including those levied by state agencies. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.03, 322.135,
379.352(4).
86.
Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
87.
Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
88.
15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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from the state. These officers are independently accountable to the
electorate unless otherwise provided by law.89

In this context, the term local governance refers to the important
state duties performed locally by the Constitution’s County Officers elected
in each county’s political subdivision.90 The sovereign independence of the
Constitution’s County Officers is important and is set up by our Constitution
to eliminate even the appearance—much less the reality—of local influence
on the important state work performed by these officers on the county
level.91 The independence and election of the Constitution’s County Officers
maintains service and accountability only to the electorate in the local county
political subdivision and not to the interests of the local general purpose
collegial governing body that would benefit from exercising undue influence
and political control over these offices to the detriment of the people and to
the detriment of the people’s interest in due process, unfettered even, by the
appearance of influence by those who tax and spend.92
The Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued with
sovereignty.93 Sovereignty refers to the supreme political authority of an
independent state;94 or, in other words, a state’s “authority and . . . right to
govern itself.”95 In the United States, the fifty individual states have retained
all of their common law sovereign powers, save those that were relinquished
to the federal government.96 In Florida, state officers are imbued with a
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id.
See FLA. STAT. § 197.603.

The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of
property taxes by county tax collectors. Therefore, tax collections shall be
supervised by the Department of Revenue pursuant to [section] 195.002(1). The
Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized by this chapter under
[section] 9(a), [article] VII of the State Constitution be free from the influence or
the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and
receive property tax revenues.

Id.
92.
See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606; John B. Anderson et al., Presidential
Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 580–81 (2005).
93.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 610–11.
94.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (10th ed. 2014) (“The supreme political
authority of an independent state.”).
95.
Sovereignty Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sovereignty (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (“[A] country’s independent
authority and the right to govern itself.”).
96.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n,
2009) (“[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”);
Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 580–81.
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portion of state sovereignty.97 Similarly, the state Constitution’s County
Officers, including the County Tax Collectors, are also imbued with state
sovereignty.98 The Supreme Court of Florida has described the relationship
between the state and its officers as such:
“The term office implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power to, and possession of it by, the person filling the office; a
public office being an agency for the state, and the person whose
duty it is to perform the agency being a public officer. The term
embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and
has respect to a permanent public trust to be exercised [on] behalf
of government, and not to a merely transient, occasional, or
incidental employment.
A person, in the service of the
government, who derives his position from a duly and legally
authorized election or appointment, whose duties are continuous in
their nature, and defined by rules prescribed by government, and
not by contract, consisting of the exercise of important public
powers, trusts, or duties, as a part of the regular administration of
the government, the place and the duties remaining, though the
incumbent dies or is changed, . . . is a public officer . . . every
office, in the constitutional meaning of the term, impl[ies] an
authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either in
making, executing, or administering the laws.”99

Therefore, the Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued
with the sovereign authority of the state and, as such, shall carry out their
duties on behalf of the people of the State of Florida, free from local
influence and interference.100
1.

No Charter Regulation of, or Interference with, the Florida
Constitution’s Five Independent County Officers

Because of the sovereign independence of the Constitution’s article
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officers, and the important public
policy reasons for maintaining such independence, the general purpose
collegial local county government—made up of the Board of County
Commissioners—cannot regulate or interfere with a Constitution’s County
97.
State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 22 So. 721, 723 (Fla. 1897).
98.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722. This state
sovereignty is also abolished when the Constitution’s County Office is abolished by a county
charter. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part
II.C.2.
99.
Clyatt, 22 So. at 723 (emphasis added).
100.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/1

14

Vanassenderp and Scarpone: Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding Of County Home Rule An

2014]

TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY

15

Officer in any way, even in a charter county.101 The Constitution does state
one very limited way in which a county charter can regulate the
Constitution’s County Officers.102 Under the Constitution, article VIII,
section 1, subsection (d), Officers are to be “elected by the electors of each
county;” in other words, this is the default manner in which Constitution
County Officers are chosen.103 Alternatively, the Constitution also states that
“when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the
electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner
therein specified.”104 This limited exception would allow a charter county—
under its charter or by special act approved by the voters in the county—to
change the manner or method in which the Constitution’s County Officers
are chosen.105 An example is that one or more of these five Constitution
County Officers could be chosen by the majority of the local Board of
County Commissioners.106 However, this exception is limited expressly, in
that, even if a charter county changes the manner in which the Constitution’s
County Officers are chosen, they still remain the Constitution’s County
Officers, with plenary power and sovereign authority, and therefore shall not
be subject to the control of the county government.107
2.
In Order to Have Charter Regulation and Control, the Constitution’s
County Office Must Be Abolished, and Its Duties Transferred to a Charter’s
County Office, Either Charter-Appointed or Charter-Elected
The Constitution also allows a charter county—through its charter,
or through a special act approved by the charter county voters—to abolish
completely one or more of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) County Officers, and transfer the duties of that office to a
charter-created office.108 At that point, the Constitution’s office, which was
101.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722; 081-7 Fla. Op.
Att’y Gen. 21 (1981) (stating that County Officers retain their status as constitutional County
Officers unless abolished by charter).
102.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
103.
Id.
104.
Id. (emphasis added).
105.
Id.
106.
Id.; see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla.
1975).
107.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So.
2d at 720–21.
108.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor,
313 So. 2d. at 720 (“There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four
years, a sheriff, a tax collector, [a property appraiser], a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of
the circuit court; except, when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of
the electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner therein
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abolished, is no longer the Constitution’s County Office—even though the
new county charter office may use the same name—and therefore no longer
enjoys the same independence and plenary power of a sovereign office to
carry out the important state duties delegated by the Legislature with
insulation from influence of the local government.109 The office is thus
transformed into a non-sovereign charter county office—either elected or
appointed—and is open to complete regulation and control by the county
government.110
It is important to note though, that abolition of one or more of the
Constitution’s five County Offices and the transfer of each office’s duties to
a charter-created office are not by any means mandatory for counties that
possess charters.111 Rather, it is an option that can be exercised.112 This
concept was well explained by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demings,
when it stated: “In charter counties, the electorate has an option of either
maintaining these independent constitutional offices or abolishing them and
transferring their responsibilities to the board of the charter county or to local
offices created by the charter.”113 Thus, as long as the Constitution’s County
Office is maintained in a charter county and has not been abolished and its
duties transferred—using express language of abolition and transfer—the
county government is without the power to regulate the office, except to the

specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by
general law are transferred to another office.”) (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1(d)).
109.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens
Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
110.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822,
823–24 (Fla. 1963) (holding that “although it may be bad government,” Dade County had the
power to regulate its charter sheriff under the provisions of its county home rule charter); State
ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. 1961) (stating that charter tax assessor
retained all the same duties as a constitutional tax assessor under the charter, the only
difference was that “his political life and death depend upon the county commissioners”);
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. Additionally, section 125.63 of the Florida Statutes also indicates
that before proposing a charter, a charter commission be formed which “shall conduct a
comprehensive study of the operation of county government and of the ways in which the
conduct of county government might be improved or reorganized.” FLA. STAT. § 125.63
(2014). While there is no similar specific requirement for adoption of proposed charter
amendments, this provision does indicate to us that charter governments should only make
changes upon a finding that such changes will actually improve the conduct and operation of
state and county government on the county level. See id.
111.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
112.
See id.
113.
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1(d).
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limited extent of dictating the manner in which the Constitution’s County
Officer will be chosen.114
It is helpful to understand the terminology used in this discussion
and related case law. The Constitution is the organic base jurisdictional
authority created by the people.115 Any officer created by it—for example,
Governor, Legislator, or the Tax Collector—is the Constitution’s officer.116
It is a Constitution office, not a charter office.117 If, in a county charter, the
Constitution’s County Office of Tax Collector, Sheriff, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, or Clerk of Court is abolished, and its duties
transferred to a charter-elected or charter-appointed office, then the
Constitution’s office is gone and the replacement office is the charter’s
office.118 If the Constitution’s substantive procedural requirements are
followed, then the charter’s office was created constitutionally, but
nonetheless is no longer the Constitution’s County Officer—and thus, no
longer enjoys the independence and plenary power of a state sovereign
officer.119
3.

Charter Counties Have Broader Power to Regulate Its County
Commissioners

Unlike the provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), the provisions
pertaining to County Commissioners in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e),
are open to broader regulation through county charters.120 Although the two
provisions both contain the same operative language, “‘[e]xcept when
otherwise provided by county charter,’” the placement of that language is
important.121 In section 1, subsection (d), the operative language appears
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e).

Commissioners. Except when otherwise provided by county charter, the governing
body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners composed of five or
seven members serving staggered terms of four years. After each decennial census
the board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of
contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable. One commissioner
residing in each district shall be elected as provided by law.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
121.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Weinger, supra note 7, at 869 (quoting
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(d)–(e)). One author, in a recently published article, argued that there
is no distinction between the levels of regulation by county charters of Constitution County
Officers and County Commissioners because the two Florida constitutional provisions contain
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after the language enumerating the Constitution’s five different County
Officers and their method of election and terms, and before the two specific
alteration provisions, discussed above in subsections (a) and (b).122 In
section 1, subsection (e), the operative language is placed at the beginning of
the entire provision, signaling a broader power to regulate, because any of
the provisions that follow may be altered by a county charter.123 This
wording is in stark contrast to section 1, subsection (d), where the placement
of the operative language indicates that only certain specific and limited
alterations can be made by a county charter.124
III.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY

County Home Rule

The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli held that charter counties had
the power to term limit—or disqualify—any and all county officers.125 This
holding was founded upon the Court’s finding that its prior decision of City
of Jacksonville v. Cook (Cook I)126, “undermines the ability of counties to
govern themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home
rule power through the Florida Constitution.”127
Many court opinions and law review articles repeatedly refer to
counties’ home rule power under the 1968 Constitution as a grant of power,
but it is more properly characterized as an inherent, but limited power.128 In
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,129 the Fourth District described the
origin of county home rule power.130 First, the court stated that:
[C]harter counties . . . derive their sovereign powers from the state
through [a]rticle VIII, [s]ection 1(g) [which states]: “Counties
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local selfthe exact same language “‘except[] when [otherwise] provided by county charter.’” Weinger,
supra note 7, at 869. However, this argument is incomplete as it failed to analyze placement
of the phrase. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 869–70.
122.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)–(b), (d).
123.
Id. § 1(e).
124.
Id. § 1(d).
125.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
126.
765 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted,
Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d
86 (Fla. 2002).
127.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 293.
128.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g); e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty.,
431 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
129.
431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
130.
Id. at 609.
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government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law
approved by the vote of the electors. The governing body of a
county operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not
inconsistent with general law.”131

The Court then went on to state that “[t]hrough this provision, the
people of Florida have vested broad home rule powers in charter counties
such as Broward County,” and that the counties possess all the powers of
self-government unless preempted by state general law, and that the power is
also limited by the Florida Constitution.132 The Second District echoed these
limitations on county home rule power in Pinellas County v. City of Largo.133
In one case predating the 1968 Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Florida—in describing the power of the Legislature under the Florida
Constitution—stated that “it should further be borne in mind that our State
Constitution is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but is a limitation
voluntarily imposed by the people themselves upon their inherent lawmaking
power.”134 Prior to the 1968 Constitution, counties only derived home rule
authority as directly granted from the Florida Legislature, and did not have
any independent powers of government.135 As such, the pre-1968 home rule
power is more properly referred to as a grant of home rule power, while the
post-1968 home rule is more properly referred to as an inherent power of
self-governance, limited by the Florida Constitution and general law.136
Therefore, charter counties can exercise all the powers of local selfgovernance, as long as such exercises are not inconsistent with the Florida
Constitution, or general law as passed by the Florida Legislature.137

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g)).
Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
964 So. 2d 847, 853–54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315 (Fla. 1930) (emphasis added).
Wolff, supra note 48, at 860; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, §

27.
136.
Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III § 27, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §
1(g). State constitutions themselves are seen as “limitations on the inherent sovereign power
of states created by the people of that state.” Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin,
Election 2000: The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 691 (2002). A
constitutional scheme such as that which exists in Florida, under which there is “‘a direct
constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers [to a county] dependent only upon
the adoption of a home rule charter,’” is more properly characterized as a limitation upon
inherent power, rather than a grant of power. Williams, supra note 49, at 222.
137.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012).
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Supreme Court of Florida Decision

Oddly enough, the Supreme Court of Florida based its decision in
Telli on the fact that it agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.138
However, Justice Anstead’s statement regarding county home rule power
does not support the Court’s conclusion:
I cannot agree with the majority that the Florida
Constitution prohibits charter counties from enacting term
limits for county officers. To the contrary, the constitution
explicitly grants broad authority to charter counties over
charter officers, and, consistent with that grant, imposes no
restrictions on a county’s authority to regulate those
officers.139

With the exception of calling county home rule power a grant,
Justice Anstead’s statement is correct.140 Charter counties have full authority
to regulate charter officers.141 Several cases have held so.142
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli143—the lower
court decision preceding Telli—alluded to this conclusion in its wellreasoned distinction between the Constitution’s County Officers, listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and County Commissioners, listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (e).144 However, the Supreme Court of
Florida in Telli completely steamrolled this distinction, paying little attention
or granting any lip service at all to the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
analysis, simply noting that it was unworkable without much more
discussion.145 Accordingly, we must disagree firmly, but respectfully, with
the Supreme Court’s conclusion, as the distinction and holding of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Snipes—which is well thought-out and
supported—correctly reflects the status of the Constitution’s County
Officers, as opposed to a local charter’s county officers, namely County

138.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see
also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
139.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
140.
See id.
141.
See Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 823–24 (Fla. 1963).
142.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; Demings v.
Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
143.
67 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v.
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
144.
Id. at 417–19; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d)–(e).
145.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see
also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–96.
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Commissioners, and logically aligns the procedural and substantive history
leading up to the Court’s previous decision in Cook II.146
1.

The Telli Decision is in Direct Contradiction to the Provisions of
Article VIII, Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution

As the constitutional provision currently stands, charter counties can
take no action to interfere with any of the Constitution’s County Officers
under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), except as discussed above that a
county may choose a different manner in which such officers will be
chosen.147 This provision simply means that a charter county may use a
different procedure for choosing the Constitution’s County Officers.148
However, the option exists whereby the electors of the county may—either
by charter or special law—abolish the Constitution’s County Office when all
of the duties are transferred to another charter-created office, the charter’s
office.149 The county could then regulate the charter-created office however
it so pleases, as stated above by Justice Anstead because it is that charter’s
office, and not the Constitution’s Office.150 However, until such time as the
Constitution’s County Office is abolished and all of its duties transferred, a
charter county cannot interfere with the Constitution’s County Office and
therefore, any provisions in the county charter pertaining to the
Constitution’s County Officer would be unenforceable.151
The Cook II and Telli opinions—and their predecessors—analyze
and argue extensively over whether or not article VI, section 4, subsection
(b)152—which establishes that certain offices under the Constitution are term
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19.
081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (1981); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
Id.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also supra Part

151.
152.

See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).

III.B.
Section 4. Disqualifications.—
....
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to
any of the following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will
have served—or, but for resignation, would have served—in
that office for eight consecutive years.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

21

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1

22

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

limited—expressly establishes that all other offices within the Constitution
may not be term limited, by virtue of not being included in the article VI,
section 4, subsection (b) list.153 However, article VI, section 4, subsection
(b) is actually a moot point on this issue.154 Even assuming that this
provision did not exist in the Florida Constitution, or assuming that its
adverse implication does not apply to article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
officers, a term limit provision within a county charter could not be
enforceable against any one of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) County Officers if that office has not been abolished and its
duties transferred to a charter office, simply based on the fact that county
charters cannot regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s County
Officers.155
A contrary holding, such as that established in Telli, completely
undermines the distinction in the Florida Constitution between the
Constitution’s County Officers and a charter-created officer—the charter’s
office—that performs the same duties previously carried out by the
Constitution’s County Officers.156 The holding also completely undermines
and breaks down the status of the Constitution’s County Officers as officers
who perform important state work locally, and, because imbued with
sovereignty, are shielded from undue influence and control of the county,
and only accountable to the electorate.157
Placing term limits on any of the five Constitution County Officers
would be an interference with, and control over the Constitution’s County
Officer, in direct derogation of the Constitution.158 Although the Second
District Court of Appeal in Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in
Pinellas159—one of the lower court consolidated cases preceding Cook II—
found that the charter term limit at issue in that case would not affect the
status, duties, or responsibilities of the Constitution’s County Officers,160 a
term limit would actually affect the status of the Constitution’s County
Id.
153.
Id.; Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–513 (Fla 2012) (per
curium); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95; Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416–17 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011),
aff’d per curium, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); Cook I, 765 So. 2d 289, 290, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
154.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
155.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); supra Part II.C.2.
156.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13.
157.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13.
158.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512.
159.
775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
160.
Id. at 319; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002).
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Officers, who enjoy sovereign authority and plenary power, separate from
the control of the county governing board.161 Allowing charter counties to
term limit the Constitution’s County Officers, gives the charter county’s
governing board a source of leverage and control over the Constitution’s
County Officers.162 For example, if a charter county’s governing board does
not agree with the actions of an incumbent Tax Collector, the charter
county’s governing board might attempt to pass a term limit provision in the
county’s charter, which would prohibit the incumbent Tax Collector from
being able to run for reelection the following term and remain in office.163
Additionally, the governing board might be able to maintain leverage over
the Constitution’s County Tax Collector by simply threatening to pass a
charter term limit if the Constitution’s County Tax Collector does not take
actions in its favor.164 This kind of interference and control is exactly what
was intended to be avoided by having the Constitution’s County Officers
maintain an independence and sovereignty separate from any possible
influence or control of the local county governing body.165
Furthermore, the holding in Cook II also renders the language in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) that “‘any county office may be
abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are
transferred to another office,’” as mere surplusage.166 If counties, under their
charters, had full authority to regulate and control the Constitution’s County
Officers, there would be no need for the language regarding abolition and
transfer.167 Although charter counties have the power to impose term limits
on county officers once they have become the charter’s officers, and no
longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers, it is improper to
conclude, as Justice Anstead did, that this procedure can be side-stepped:
I can find no legal justification for concluding that charter counties
should not be allowed to ask their citizens to vote on eligibility
requirements of local elected officials, including term-limits, since
they could abolish the offices completely or decide to select the
officers in any manner of their choosing.168

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §

1(d)).
167.
168.
art. VIII, § 1(d).
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Allowing charter counties to term limit the Constitution’s County
Officers before their offices have been abolished and transferred to a
charter’s office is an illegal means of achieving a result that would be legal
under different means, and allowing such regulation and control will upset
the balance of power struck by the Constitution.169 In a word, the Telli
decision is alarming in ignoring base provisions of the Florida
Constitution.170
a.

Additional Critiques of Reliance on Justice Anstead’s Dissent in
Cook II

The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli based its holding on its
agreement with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.171 Part of Justice
Anstead’s reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) did not
prohibit charter counties from implementing term limits on any and all of its
county officers—the Constitution’s County Officers and County
Commissioners—was that the offices in that section for which term limits are
listed expressly are offices of statewide importance.172 As such, he
concluded that the provision should have no bearing whatsoever on local
officers.173 However, this statement fails to acknowledge the distinction
between the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in and
created by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and that of other local
officers who perform exclusively local duties—namely County
Commissioners—and the fact that the work that the Constitution’s five
County Officers perform is in fact work of statewide importance
implemented and carried out on the county level.174
Additionally, this distinction also undermines Justice Anstead’s
second reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) cannot
prohibit the implementation of term limits in charter counties for all county
officers whether it be the Constitution’s County Officers, the charter’s

169.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
170.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504,
513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
171.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
172.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
173.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
174.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla.
2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
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county officers, or County Commissioners.175 Justice Anstead noted that
“there is no wording in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b)—or anywhere
else in the Florida Constitution or the Florida Statutes—that indicates that the
named officers in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b) are subject to term
limits to the exclusion of all other government officers, state or local, in the
State of Florida.”176 However, there is also no wording in article VI, section
4, subsection (b) to indicate that the specific disqualifications and election
provisions should apply exclusively to those offices of specific statewide
importance.177 In fact, sections 6 and 7 of article VI contain wording
indicating that the provisions in those sections expressly apply only to
municipal or district elections and statewide elections, respectively.178 This
wording is evidence that the Constitution drafters know how to write
provisions expressly applicable to only certain offices and or elections, and if
they so intended for article VI, section 4, subsection (b) to apply only to
offices of statewide importance as defined by Justice Anstead, they would
have expressly noted that restriction.179
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Telli, and its
reliance on Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II, fails to acknowledge and
undermines the Constitution’s specific distinction that exists between the
Constitution’s five County Officers listed in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), and the County Commissioners listed in article VIII, section
1, subsection (e).180 The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal made a
175.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418.
176.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
177.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504,
512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
178.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6–7.
Section 6. Municipal and district elections.—Registration
and elections in municipalities shall, and in other governmental entities
created by statute may, be provided by law.
Section 7. Campaign spending limits and funding of
campaigns for elective state-wide office.—It is the policy of this state to
provide for state-wide elections in which all qualified candidates may
compete effectively. A method of public financing for campaigns for
state-wide office shall be established by law. Spending limits shall be
established for such campaigns for candidates who use public funds in
their campaigns. The legislature shall provide funding for this
provision. General law implementing this paragraph shall be at least as
protective of effective competition by a candidate who uses public funds
as the general law in effect on January 1, 1998.

Id. (emphasis added).
179.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6).
180.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Cook II, 823
So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
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detailed analysis of these two sets of offices in the lower court decision of
Snipes.181 First, the court noted that the structure of the two sets of offices is
distinctly different under article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution,
specifically with regards to changes to be made by a county charter.182 The
court noted that “[t]he section 1, [subsection] (d) officers are established with
precise language . . . . [The section] establishe[d] that a county government
shall have certain named officers, and grants the county limited powers to
change the manner of electing those officers, or to abolish an office
altogether and transfer its duties to another county office.”183 In contrast,
“the section 1, [subsection] (e) commissioners are described as a default
option when a county charter does not provide otherwise.”184 Section 1,
subsection (d) requires each county to have the five Constitution County
Officers, and is followed by language that authorizes a limited way in which
a county by charter may abolish the Constitution’s County Office and
transfer its duties to a charter-created office, the charter’s office.185
Conversely, section 1, subsection (e) does not require that the composition of
the Board of County Commissioners be set up in the way enumerated in the
Constitution; it is simply a default.186 By beginning section 1, subsection (e)
with the words “‘[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter, . . . .’
[t]he language of the Constitution expressly cedes power to a county charter
when it comes to the creation of a county’s collegial governing body.”187
Additionally, the court went on to discuss the practicality of the
Constitution preferring statewide uniformity for section 1, subsection (d)
officers.188 This practicality argument is further bolstered by the fact that the
Constitution’s five County Officers perform important statewide work on the
county level, which is intended to be free of interference or influence of the

181.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 417–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g
granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So.
3d 504 (Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
182.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
183.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
184.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e).
185.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417.
186.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); see also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417.
187.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1(e)).
188.
Id. at 418 (“Persons traveling and doing business between counties should
deal with a common set of section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers, i.e., sheriff, tax
collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, and should not
be forced to navigate byzantine bureaucracies to accomplish similar tasks. Likewise,
legislators seeking to regulate section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers should not be forced
to take a variety of different titles and job descriptions into account in order to achieve a single
legislative objective.”); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
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local county governing board.189 Conversely, the court notes that “these
reasons for statewide uniformity are less applicable to the county’s
[collegial] governing body,” whose duties “need not be kept uniform by the
Constitution, but may rather be fashioned to suit the particular wants and
needs of the voters of the county they serve.”190 The difference in status in
the Florida Constitution between these two groups of officers “reflects the
common sense conclusion that, as a matter of policy, the balance of state and
local interests favors statewide uniformity for the [Constitution’s five County
Officers], and local flexibility for the [governing Board of County
Commissioners].”191
The precise language in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e),
“[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter,” represents the shift in
power and authority that resulted from the 1968 Constitution denoting broad
county home rule powers.192 Accordingly, prior to this change, even County
Commissioners were considered constitution officers,193 the election and
qualifications of whom could not be changed.194 However, this consideration
is no longer true under the 1968 Constitution in charter counties that have
established the form of its governing Board of County Commissioners under
its charter, rather than utilizing the fallback option listed in article VIII,
section 1, subsection (e).195 Once a charter county decides to establish and to
regulate its governing board under its charter, the County Commissioners are
local charter county officers, who—as Justice Anstead pointed out in his
dissent in Cook II—the charter county has the power and authority to
regulate.196 It is under this distinction and analysis that the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Snipes held that the holding of Cook II did not extend to
County Commissioners, and that charter term limits for those offices are
permissible under the Florida Constitution.197

189.
See supra Part II.C.
190.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
191.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
192.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added), with FLA.
CONST., art. VIII, § 1(e) (amended 1973).
193.
State v. Walton Cnty., 112 So. 630, 632 (Fla. 1927) (“[T]he board of
county commissioners of each county are constitutional officers, and under the terms of the
Constitution their powers and duties shall be fixed and prescribed by the Legislature.”).
194.
See Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735 n.2 (Fla. 1969) (quoting FLA.
CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 5 (1943)).
195.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e), (g).
196.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting); see
also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g).
197.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to even analyze this distinction.198
In its decision, the Court simply recapped the two lower court consolidated
decisions and its previous decision in Cook II, then simply noted that it no
longer agreed with its previous decision, and would recede from it because it
now agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent.199 Rather than analyzing
specifically why the distinction drawn by the Fourth District Court of Appeal
was erroneous, the Court simply noted that it was unworkable and “would
undermine the ability to predict what offices may be included within the
scope of [Cook II’s] prohibition on term-limits and would result in apparent
inconsistencies between county officials.”200 However, we firmly and
respectfully disagree with the Court’s hasty, careless, unreasoned, and
alarming conclusion about the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding.201
Based on the procedural and substantive history of the previous decisions
involved in the Cook II case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding is
clear and logically aligns the past precedent.202
As correctly noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the
holding of Cook II only expressly applied to the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).203 The first
case that Cook II reviewed was Cook I.204 This case was a challenge by the
Clerk of Court for Duval County to a City of Jacksonville charter term limit
provision.205 The second case was Eight is Enough in Pinellas.206 This case
198.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–13 (Fla. 2012) (per
curiam); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419.
199.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96
(Arnstead, J., dissenting).
200.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67
So. 3d at 419.
201.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419.
202.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87–90; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416, 419.
203.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II,
823 So. 2d at 94–95.
204.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also Cook I, 765
So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of
Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
205.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 290. The challenge was
to the City of Jacksonville Charter, rather than a county charter because under the Florida
Constitution, the City of Jacksonville currently operates “in the place of any or all county . . .
government[].” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88. This section also
contains a similar provision as article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), regarding abolition of the
Constitution’s County Officers, which states: “No county office shall be abolished or
consolidated with another office without making provision for the performance of all state
duties now or hereafter prescribed by law to be performed by such county officer.” Compare
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). Contrary to the belief of
many—Duval County is not a charter county. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 6 n. 1. There is no
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began with a resident of the county seeking declaratory judgment that a
charter provision implementing term limits for the Constitution’s five County
Officers as well as the County Commissioners was invalid.207 The trial court
found the provisions valid and, thereafter, the Constitution’s five County
Officers intervened as plaintiffs.208 The trial court upheld the provision and
the resident, the Constitution County Officers, and the county itself,
appealed.209 The Second District affirmed the trial court.210 “The incumbent
[C]lerk of . . . [C]ourt, [T]ax [C]ollector, and [S]heriff petitioned [the
Supreme Court of Florida] for review, but the [B]oard of [C]ounty
[C]ommissioners did not.”211 The Fourth District in Snipes correctly noted
that the failure of the County Commissioners to petition for review of the
Second District’s decision was significant “because it had the effect of
removing that office from the holding of [Cook II].”212 Interestingly enough,
the Supreme Court of Florida conveniently failed to include this fact in its
opinion in Telli.213
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Cook II could not have
been more clear and express about the fact that it was only reviewing the
validity of term limit provisions on the Constitution’s five County Officers
enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).214 The Court phrased
the issue in the case as such from the very outset of the opinion.215 Given the
foregoing analysis, we would firmly and respectfully disagree with the
careless and irresponsible conclusion of the Court in Telli, that unworkable
Duval County government. See id. There is no consolidated government, and if and when the
electors of Duval County vote in, or have an election to approve a county charter, the city of
Jacksonville, by operation of law, will no longer act in operation and in place of the county
government. See id.
206.
Pinellas Cnty. v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d 317, 317 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d
86 (Fla. 2002).
207.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
208.
Id. at 510–11; Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d at 318.
209.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 510–11.
210.
Id. at 511.
211.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012).
212.
Id.; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 94–95 (Fla. 2002).
213.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506–13.
214.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90–91; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d).
215.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90.
The issue we address in these consolidated cases is whether a charter
county may in its charter impose a “term limit” provision upon those county officer
positions which are authorized by article VIII, section 1, [subsection] (d), Florida
Constitution, where the charter county through its charter has not abolished those
county officer positions.

Id.
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confusion will result as to which officers the Cook II decision would
apply.216
This is not to say that even under Cook II, charter counties have no
power whatsoever to term limit its officers.217 Charter counties still have the
ability to abolish any of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and transfer the duties to a separate
charter-created office, which it could then term limit in the same manner that
it can term limit its charter governing board and any other charter officers.218
The officers would then be the charter’s non-sovereign county officers, and
no longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers.219 This distinction
was also made in Cook II, as the issue posed specifically addressed the
section 1, subsection (d), County Officers, “where the charter county through
its charter has not abolished those county officer positions.”220 The Court in
Cook II held that term limits could only be imposed on constitutional—that
is, not-yet-abolished—County Officers through an amendment to the
Constitution.221
IV.

PATHWAYS TO REVIEW: WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?222

While the pathway for review in attempting to correct the Telli
decision is rather limited and bleak, there are some methods available by
which one could attempt to get the decision revisited and hopefully
overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida.223 It is important to note that a
state’s supreme court is the final and ultimate arbiter on issues of state law.224
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida is the final arbiter of the state
constitutional law issues involved in Telli, and the trial courts and district
courts of appeal are bound to follow the Telli decision until such time as it is
overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court.225 However, this
does not mean that one could not argue a case on the same issue back up to
the Supreme Court of Florida, on the premise that the Telli decision was

216.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
217.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90.
218.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e), (g); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95.
219.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
220.
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
221.
Id. at 94–95.
222.
This list of pathways to review is by no means all-inclusive.
223.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a); Telli v. Broward
Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
224.
E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406,
1413 (11th Cir. 1997).
225.
See Nielson, 116 F.3d at 1413; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
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decided erroneously and in direct derogation of the Florida Constitution.226
There are several different options for getting the issue back to the Supreme
Court of Florida.227
A.

Constitutional Amendment

One option would be for a constitutional amendment to be passed
which would clarify the status of the Constitution’s County Officers, and
make it explicit that no actions could be taken to interfere with—including
placing term limits on—the Constitution’s County Officers, until and unless
their offices have been abolished and duties transferred to a charter-created
office.228 The Florida Constitution sets out several different ways to propose
and pass amendments to the Florida Constitution.229 However, we believe
that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary. The Florida Constitution
does not need to be amended in this situation; its plain language simply
needs to be followed.230 We believe that the limited powers and authority of
charter counties to regulate or control the Constitution’s County Officers is
clear from the plain language of the Florida Constitution as it stands.231
B.

Review of District Court of Appeal Decision

The second option for getting back to the Supreme Court of Florida
would be through review of a district court of appeal decision.232 Under this
option, one would have to bring a case in a Florida circuit court.233 As noted
above, the Florida circuit courts are bound by Supreme Court precedence,
and so any circuit court would be bound to rule that charter term limits for
any or all of the Constitution’s County Officers are constitutionally
permissible based on Telli.234 However, an appeal could then be taken and
heard by a district court of appeal.235 The district court of appeal would also
be bound to follow Telli, and therefore would affirm the trial court’s
226.
See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–71; see also Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
227.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii),
(a)(2)(A)–(B).
228.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), (g).
229.
FLA. CONST. art. XI.
230.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
231.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
232.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
Id. § 4(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
233.
234.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513
(Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
235.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) (“District courts of appeal shall have
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or
orders of trial courts . . . .”).
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judgment.236 The party could then petition the Supreme Court of Florida for
review; however, the case would fall into the category of cases for which the
Supreme Court of Florida only has discretionary review,237 so there is no
guarantee that the Court would hear the case.238 It could just as easily decide
not to, based on the fact that it has just recently issued the Telli opinion.239
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida would have discretion to
review the case if a district court of appeal certifies a question to be of great
public importance that it has passed upon.240 The Supreme Court of Florida
could also immediately hear a review of the trial court judgment—of which
appeal is pending—if a district court of appeal certifies the case “to be of
great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require
immediate resolution by the [S]upreme [C]ourt.”241
C.

Writ of Quo Warranto

A writ of quo warranto is “used to test the right of a person either to
hold an office . . . or to exercise some right or privilege.”242 Under the
Florida Statutes, a person who claims the right to hold public office may
bring a petition for writ of quo warranto if the Attorney General refuses to
bring the petition.243 The Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to hear
petitions for writs of quo warranto, challenging the right of a person to hold
state office.244 The Supreme Court of Florida has previously held that the
title state officer under this provision “contemplates possession or use[] of a
certain portion of sovereignty for the benefit of the people.”245 Because the
Constitution’s County Officers are sovereign officers, they are also subject to

236.
See id.; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
237.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). Under this option, the Supreme Court of
Florida could review the District Court’s decision based on the fact that it “expressly
construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers.” Id. Because of the constitutional issues involved in the case,
conflict between more than one district is not necessary for discretionary Supreme Court
review. See id.
238.
See id.
239.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
240.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
241.
Id. § 3(b)(5).
242.
Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts,
32 STETSON L. REV. 347, 354 (2003).
243.
FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014).
244.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (The Supreme Court of Florida “[m]ay issue
writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies.”).
245.
Ex parte Smith, 118 So. 306, 307 (Fla. 1928).
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a writ of quo warranto from the Supreme Court of Florida.246 Therefore, this
would be a viable method for getting this issue back to the Supreme Court of
Florida directly, but one would have to wait for several things to occur
before bringing such a petition.247
First, a charter county would have to pass a charter term limit
applicable to one or more of the Constitution’s County Officers.248 Second,
an incumbent Constitution County Officer would have to be denied the
ability to run in the next election following the passage of the charter term
limit.249 Third, and related, a new Constitution County Officer would be
elected and would take office.250 At this point, the incumbent Constitution
County Officer—who was denied the ability to run for office again—would
have the right to petition the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of quo
warranto, challenging the newly-elected Constitution County Officer’s right
to hold that office.251 The incumbent Constitution County Officer would
have a claim to that office because had the charter term limit provision not
been enacted—in derogation of the Florida Constitution—he or she would
have been able to run again, and possibly would have been reelected.252
However, the Supreme Court of Florida’s jurisdiction for hearing a petition
for a writ of quo warranto is discretionary as well, so again, there is no
guarantee that the Court would hear the petition.253
Similarly, because a writ of quo warranto can also be used to
challenge an exercise of authority derived from a public office,254 the writ
could also possibly be used to challenge the authority of a charter review
committee to consider and propose charter term limits for the Constitution’s
County Officers.255 However, the jurisdiction for this particular writ would
fall in the circuit court,256 the decision of which would then have to be
appealed up to a Florida district court of appeal—just like any other case—
and would not be guaranteed review by the Supreme Court of Florida.257

246.
247.
248.

See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505–06 (Fla. 2012) (per

curiam).
249.
Id. at 506.
250.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 74 So. 3d at 506.
251.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8); FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014); see also Ex
parte Smith, 118 So. at 307.
252.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
253.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
254.
See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1338–39 (Fla. 1989).
255.
See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868.
256.
See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(c)(3).
257.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), 4(b)(3); supra Parts II–IV.
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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal’s decision and reasoning in Snipes should have been affirmed in
Telli.258 Under the Florida Constitution, charter counties have broad
authority to regulate their County Commissioners fully, and therefore, the
authority exists to set term limits for them within the county charter.259
Conversely, there is only very limited and specific authority for counties to
regulate the Constitution’s five County Officers under their charters.260 That
is, specifically, a county may only establish a different manner in which
these officers shall be chosen under the county charter; and as long as a
charter county has not abolished the Constitution’s County Office and
transferred its duties to a charter-created office—the charter’s office—it
remains the Constitution’s County Officer’s, and charter counties possess no
more power than non-charter counties to regulate them.261 This point of law
means that charter counties possess no more power than non-charter counties
to set term limits for the Constitution’s five County Officers.262
The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Telli failed to take into
account the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers, completely
abridging the distinction drawn by the Constitution between a Constitution’s
County Officer and a charter’s county officer, and therefore, illegally and
without authority or jurisdiction, has effectuated an amendment to the
Florida Constitution, which it does not possess the power to effectuate.263
Only the people of Florida can effectuate an amendment to the Florida
Constitution through an amendment election vote.264 The Telli opinion
unconstitutionally abridges the rights of both incumbent holders of the
Constitution’s County Offices and of the voters who may wish to vote for
those incumbent Constitution County Officers.265 For this reason, the
opinion is untenable, disconcerting, not judicially cognizant, devoid of
constitutional integrity, and, if enforced, precipitates needlessly an
258.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v.
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012);
Weinger, supra note 7, at 860, 870.
259.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g).
260.
Id. § 1(g).
261.
See id. § 1(e)–(g).
262.
See id. § 1(f)–(g).
263.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra
note 7, at 869–70.
264.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b), (e).
265.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra
note 7, at 868–70.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/1

34

Vanassenderp and Scarpone: Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding Of County Home Rule An

2014]

TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY

35

unnervingly serious constitutional problem, which must be solved.266 There
is a dire need for the issue to make its way back to the Supreme Court of
Florida for reconsideration of the constitutional implications of the Telli
decision. If not revisited, there will soon be officers elected and sworn into
sovereign state office in derogation of the Florida Constitution. If the issue
does in fact make its way back to the discretionary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Florida, one would hope that the Court would exercise its
discretion in favor of hearing the issue, if only to correct the dire
constitutional issues placed before it; and then, also to correct a careless and
unsupported opinion that is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s well-earned
respect as one of the best state supreme courts in the United States of
America.

266.
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